

Πλάτων и платоноведение

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Aspects of the Dianoetical Consideration of the Soul in the *Republic*

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ABSTRACT. Taking as a hypothesis the idea that the central images of books VI–VII of the *Republic* — the sun, the line and the cave — are just an outline that nevertheless throws light on the meaning of the whole dialogue, as much as the dialogue as a whole does on those images, the author discusses some problems concerning the middle sections of the line: their relation as much as the meaning of the contradiction resulting from the different criteria applied to their division — according to mathematical proportion (509d7–8) and according to their respective degree of clarity (509d9). In doing this, he tries to show the dianoetical character of the tripartition of the soul — its deduction from the law of non-contradiction taken as a hypothesis which, nevertheless, will be assumed as a principle — and its consequences for the nature of the objects of *διάνοια*, especially of mathematical entities, which share their conceptual nature with the law of non-contradiction.

KEYWORDS: soul, *dianoia*, law or principle of non-contradiction, mathematical entities.

As we know, Plato's images of the sun, the line and the cave are no more than an outline (ὑπογραφή, 504d6–7, see 509c5–10). As such, they leave many things unsaid (συχνά γε ἀπολείπω, 509c7) and are, therefore, very controversial.¹ One of the controversial aspects concerns the description of the affection of the soul called *διάνοια*. First of all, if we take into account the interchange of *πίστις* and *διάνοια* at

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Πλατωνικές έρευνες / Platonic Investigations 9.2 (2018)

DOI: 10.25985/PI.9.2.01

¹ See Lafrance 1994; Smith 1996, cf. the attached bibliography.

509d7–8 and 511e2, we have to admit that Plato knew that as a result of dividing the line according to the same proportion (509d7–8, 511e2) the equality of the intermediate subdivisions, those of πίστις and διάνοια, would follow, but also that if we divide it taking clarity and truth as criteria, they must be unequal (ἄνισα, 509d6). Thus, we have to reflect on the intention of this contradiction.² Secondly, even though the distinction between διάνοια and νόησις is, as it seems, merely methodological, not ontological, due to the mathematical entities which Socrates mentions at this level (510c3–5, d7–8), much has been discussed about their nature — are they Ideas,³ visible⁴ or mental⁵ images of Ideas, intermediates⁶ — and their role as either mere examples or as exclusive objects of διάνοια. But precisely the fact that Socrates does speak of the square and the diagonal in itself seems to some interpreters to be reason enough to identify these mathematical entities with Ideas⁷ and to distinguish διάνοια from νόησις just taking into consideration the fact that they respectively use or don't use visible images of Ideas (510b4, d5–7). My proposal to discuss these enormously controversial points will try to show the dianoetical character of the Platonic consideration of the soul in *Republic* IV, 434d–444e and its consequences for the nature of the soul's tripartition.⁸ In doing this I presuppose 1) the parallelism between the line and the cave (517b1: προσαπτέον ἄπασαν

² So far as I know, the first author who takes this contradiction seriously, who thinks that Plato uses contradiction as a method, and makes a proposal about its meaning is Foley 2008. I develop his proposal in Gutiérrez 2015b.

³ See Cross & Woosley 1964: 230, 237; Hamlyn 1958: 16; Nettleship 1925: 250; Robinson 1953: 195: "The quantitative Ideas dealt with by mathematicians are other than the ethical Ideas dealt with by dialectics," see also p. 197; Ross 1953: 67 ff.; Karasmanis 1988: 164.

⁴ Smith 1996.

⁵ Cooper 1966; Tanner 1970.

⁶ Arist. *Metaph.* A, 987b15–18. See Burnyeat 2000; Szlezák 2003: 64 ff.

⁷ As an example see Dorter 2006: 197: "...Socrates' statement that the practitioners of *dianoia* use visible objects (of *pistis*) as images to enable them to think about objects like 'the square itself and the diagonal itself' (510d), for that means that the proper objects of *dianoia* are the forms themselves." This has important consequences for his understanding of the structure of the *Republic*.

⁸ See my first attempt in this direction in Gutiérrez 2009 and further developments

τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεγομένοις 517a8–518b5, 532a1–535a1), even if there are some evident differences,⁹ and 2) the idea that these images and the whole of the *Republic* illuminate each other.¹⁰ But let me start with a formal aspect.

1. *An ascent in logos as an allegorical topography*¹¹

As in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the first word in the *Republic* – κατέβην – introduces the main action in the dialogue, the κατάβασις of the philosopher to the cave and the corresponding ἀνάβασις out of the cave. In this way Plato introduces what I call an allegorical topography. Having discussed the shadows of justice with those who have never seen justice itself,¹² Glaucon and Adeimantus propose to consider justice and injustice in the soul, but given that the enquiry is “not easy and requires a keen vision (οὐ φαῦλον, ἀλλ’ ὅξυ βλέποντος, 368c9)”, Socrates proposes the famous city/soul analogy: to consider first (πρῶτον) political justice, in order to examine afterwards (ἔπειτα) personal justice (369a1–2). This procedure presupposes that political

in Gutiérrez 2012 and 2017. Other interpreters, like Cooper and Dorter, consider books VI–VII of the *Republic* to correspond to διάνοια. See Cooper 1966; Dorter 2004.

⁹ For instance, the shadows of the line are clearly images of sensible entities, whereas those of the cave are images of the statues built and transported by other men, and which are usually taken to represent the laws. About this parallelism see Karasmanis 1988; Gutiérrez 2009 and 2017; Szlezák 2003: 94 ff. Against this see already Ferguson 1921: 138. The sentence in question is formulated in such a way that it could be referred not just to the line and the sun, but to all the earlier books.

¹⁰ As the Idea of the Good illuminates the Ideas, the simile of the sun – and the line and the cave just show the way up to it – illuminates the whole dialogue, that is, the simile is the unity of meaning which gives meaning to the whole dialogue. See Gutiérrez 2003, 2009 and 2017.

¹¹ See Gutiérrez 2017: 86–94.

¹² About the philosopher Socrates says significantly: “Do you suppose it is anything surprising, if a man, come from acts of divine contemplation to the human evils, is graceless and looks quite ridiculous when – with his sight still dim and before he has gotten sufficiently accustomed to the surrounding darkness – he is compelled in courts or elsewhere to contest about the shadows of the just or the representations (ἀγαλμάτων) of which they are the shadows, and to dispute about the way these things are understood by men who have never seen justice itself?” (517d, trans. by A. Bloom).

justice is an image of personal justice (εἰδωλὸν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης, 443c4–5, 369a3–4, 435a5–b3), and therefore reminds us of the method of διάνοια.¹³ Socrates says that διάνοια and the mathematicians use images (ὡς εἰκόσιν χρωμένῃ, 510b4) or visible figures (τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἶδεσι προσχρῶνται, 510d5), and reason about them thinking not of them but of that which they resemble (οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοοῦμενοι, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνων περὶ οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, 510d6–7), i.e. mathematical entities (510d5–511a1). Their intentional objects are these, not the images. Thus we have the same procedure as in the study of personal justice through the analogy with political justice. However, if we look closer at the text, for a long period the discussion remains focused on political justice.¹⁴ So much so that in *Republic* IV Socrates still says that “it is manifest” that political justice “is somewhere here” (φανερὸν γὰρ δὴ ὅτι ταύτῃ πῇ ἔστιν), but “the place appears to be hard going and steeped in shadows, it is certainly dark and hard to search thoroughly (δύσβατος γέ τις ὁ τόπος φαίνεται καὶ ἐπισκιος· δύσβατος γέ τις ὁ τόπος φαίνεται καὶ ἐπίσκιος· ἔστι γοῦν σκοτεινὸς καὶ δυσδιερεύνητος)” (432c1–9). This means that we are still in the cave, not discussing the shadows anymore (*R. I*), but the statues of justice (*R. II–IV*, 434d),¹⁵ since even though it is still shadowy and dark, there is already a trace (ἵχνος, 432d3), for “it was apparently tumbling about our feet from the start and yet we couldn’t see it (ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἑωρῶμεν ἄρ’ αὐτό, d8–9)”. The reason why we were not able to see it was that instead of looking at what we had before us, we looked at what was far off, at justice in the soul instead of at justice in the city (καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀπεβλέπομεν, πόρρω δὲ ποι ἀπεσκοποῦμεν, e1–2). The meaning of “from the start” — ἐξ ἀρχῆς — will be precisely determined as “when we were founding our city”, that is, in *Republic* II, and the trace he is talking about is “that each one should practice one thing only... for which his nature is best adapted” (433a5–6). “This or some

¹³ See Smith 1999; Gutiérrez 2017: 77.

¹⁴ See Graeser 1969: 13, n. 1.

¹⁵ *R.* 517d8–9: ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί. Plato uses here the generic ἀγαλμα, whereas in the cave simile (514c1) and also referring to the way Glaucon presents the just and the unjust man (361d5), he uses ἀνδριάς.

form of this is justice (τοῦτο ἐστίν... ἤτοι τούτου τι εἶδος ἡ δικαιοσύνη)” (433a3, b3), a certain “origin and pattern of justice (ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνης)” (443c1). This vagueness is due to the fact that political justice is just a visible trace, an image of personal justice, which nevertheless allows the philosopher to instruct those whom he tries to release. On the contrary, at the end of *Republic* IV, concluding the examination of political justice and injustice, Socrates speaks of an ascent in the argument (ἀναβέβηκαμεν τοῦ λόγου) up to a point from where “as from a watch tower (ὥσπερ ἀπὸ σκοπίας),” we can look with absolute clarity (σαφέστατα) (445bc). Thus we have a spatial ascent which corresponds to the advancement of knowledge according to the criterion of more or less clarity applied in the line (509d9, 511e3) and to the transition from political justice to justice in the soul. This is the ascent from πίστις to διάνοια. As such, looking from that height downwards we can describe this relation as the dialectics of original and image,¹⁶ as the appearance of the same as other depending on the clarity of the “place” where it appears, and of the greater or lesser righteousness of sight. This procedure, I sustain, will be used time and again as a pattern of thought: 1) in the analogy polis-psyche, 2) the two expositions of the virtues, first virtues in the city and then virtues in the soul,¹⁷ and 3) the two levels of mathematical studies of the future philosopher. I suggest that all three cases, which can be described in terms of the above mentioned dialectics of original and image, are well represented by the equality and inequality of the middle sections of the line. Let us now attend to some aspects of the dianoetical character of the investigation of personal justice.

2. Neither analogy nor dialectics, but the hypothetical deductive method of διάνοια

Once the enquiry into political justice has come to its end, Socrates

¹⁶ See *Sph.* 240a7–8: “Why, Stranger, what can we say an image (εἶδωλον) is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness (ἁφωμοιωμένον) of the true one?” (trans. by Harold N. Fowler).

¹⁷ According to 435b, not just justice, but all four civic and personal virtues share the same affections and habits (πάθη καὶ ἔξεις). As such they are similar.

invites us to transfer its results to the individual and to consider whether they share a similar structure. Socrates comments: “Once again we’ve come upon an easy question (εἰς φαῦλόν γε αὖ).” But Glaucon replies: “It doesn’t look easy to me (οὐ πάνυ μοι δικοῦμεν εἰς φαῦλον). Perhaps, Socrates, there’s some truth in the old saying that everything fine is beautiful” (435c7–8). The contrast between the easiness of that investigation and the difficulty of the present one signals the ascent to a new reflection level, that of διάνοια. And with a second formulation of the analogy polis-psyche, Socrates proposes to complete the enquiry — νῦν δ’ ἐκτελέσωμεν τὴν σκέψιν, 434d5 — transferring the results of the political analysis to the soul. But this does not occur in a straightforward manner. Then even if we agree that the characteristics of the city do not proceed from anywhere else other than from ourselves (435e2),¹⁸ the analogy has first to be completely established, that is, we have to look first into the soul and see if the city’s forms and dispositions are there or not, “rubbing them together like sticks,” until there is light (434e–435a). The difficulty relating to the structure of the soul and how we act concerns whether it has three different aspects or just one: whether that by which we learn, that by which we feel anger, and that by which we feel physical pleasure are the same or different; and if they are different, whether in every case we act with just one of them or with the entire soul (436a). This enquiry requires a change of method. Then, as Socrates says, the methods used until now in the arguments, that is analogy and the narrative of the genesis of the city, do not allow for handling this problem accurately (ἀκριβῶς). In order to get ἀκριβεία, we have to take a longer and further road, that of dialectics, which won’t be immediately followed.¹⁹ But, as Socrates adds,

¹⁸ Against taking this proposal at face value see Ferrari 2009.

¹⁹ See the reference to this passage at 504b and 532e–533e. The question here is whether this longer road of dialectics will be exhaustively followed in *Republic* V–VII. In my view, even if these books proceed dialectically — which I believe they do —, they don’t seem to do so up to the end of the journey (532e3). See Gutiérrez 2015a. Graeser believes that the structure of the soul will be examined dialectically: “Der Gegenstand der Untersuchung wird im Sinn platonischer Denkweise durchaus dialektisch angegangen. Dies zeigt die begrifflich-gedankliche Struktur der Argumentation, der das

there may be another way *worthy* (ἄξιως) of the foregoing statements and investigations about political justice: keeping in mind the results of the enquiry into political justice, even if we cannot achieve dialectical precision, we must look for another way in order to *complete* (ἐκτελέσωμεν) the analogy polis-psyche.²⁰ As we shall see, this is the method attributed to διάνοια.²¹ Then, using nearly the same wording as in the line simile, Socrates takes as its starting point a hypothesis (ὑποθέμενοι, 437a6, 510c3, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις, 510c6), considered as evident (δῆλον, 436b8, φανερόν, 510d1), that is, as a principle (ἀρχή), according to which thought must get in agreement with itself (ὁμολογέσαντες, 437a6, ὁμολογούμενος, 510d2), without giving any explanation neither to itself nor to others (436e7–437a1, 510c1–d1, 511b5). Now, the hypothesis which he takes as a starting point is the earliest version of the principle of non-contradiction:²²

It is clear that the same will not be willing to do or suffer opposites with regard to the same, in relation to the same and at the same time, so that if we find these [things] occurring among the operations [of the soul] we shall know that it is not the same but more than one. (436b9–c2)²³

Kontradiktionsprinzip zugrunde liegt (436b8–c2)”, see Graeser 1969: 14 n. 2. Against this see Szlezák 1976.

²⁰ R. 435c9–d4: καὶ εὖ γ’ ἴσθι, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὥς ἡ ἐμὴ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μέθοδων, οἷας νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα, οὐ μὴ ποτε λάβωμεν· ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδὸς ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄγουσα· ἴσως μέντοι τῶν γε προειρημένων ἄξιως. Cf. 504b.

²¹ See Gutiérrez 2009 and 2017.

²² Since this principle is not concerned just with “propositions and logical relations”, but with “whether a certain thing can have a certain property”, and since “he is concerned with opposites in a very broad sense, not just contradictories” (Annas 1977: 30), it has become usual, mostly in the Anglo-American tradition, to speak of the principle of conflict, opposites, contrariety, and so on. I rather keep this denomination due to its importance for thinking and being, and to its similarity to Aristotle’s formulation.

²³ 436b9–c2: Δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸν τάναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτὸν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα, ὥστε ἂν πού εὕρισκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἄλλα πλείω. Not to forget is that the different aspects of the soul are aspects of one and the “same” soul.

Taking this as a hypothesis, Socrates will distinguish two contrary movements in the soul, one of acceptance and one of refusal, of longing to take something and of rejecting it, and so on (437b1–3). Accordingly, he will distinguish an irrational and a rational movement in the soul. In need of mediation between the two, he will introduce a third movement, the spirited, an auxiliary by nature to the rational (441a).

But I would like to emphasize that in contrast to the analogy which puts two different ontological levels in relation, the soul — actually the rational soul — finds in itself the principle that it needs as a starting point in order to enquire about its own structure. Consequently, we are not dealing with a simple transfer of the city's structure to the soul, but with a reflection on its structure based on a principle that, as a principle of thought, shares its nature. As such, this principle constitutes the formal aspect of the self-reflexive movement of the soul. Therefore, self-reflection and the principle of non-contradiction mutually imply each other, so much so that this principle finds its first formulation in and because of this reflection. Furthermore, based on this principle, the rational soul distinguishes the nature and functions of the operative principles in virtue of which the soul relates itself with itself — ἐντὸς πράξις — and with the world — ἔξω πράξις (443d); as such, and like the mathematical entities, these principles can be considered by themselves or in relation to the world — an aspect, which once again is well represented by the equality and inequality of the middle sections of the line. Precisely this kind of knowledge grounded in the principle of non-contradiction is the one which presides over every just action establishing and preserving a just order in the soul. Therefore, according to Socrates, it deserves to be called σοφία (443e): it is, indeed, the wisdom of διάνοια. But as long as we take into account the hypothetical character of that principle, the result of the deduction of the structure of the soul is not to be taken as absolutely certain, but as delivering a suitable or reasonable (ἐπιεκῶς, 612a5) explanatory model of the soul in its present condition, an explanation of its phenomenic and operational aspect, as long as it dwells in the body, acts upon it and is affected by it, but not of its true and primordial nature (611b–612a). The limits of this

model become evident if we have in mind, first, that only the rational and the irrational aspects of the souls are deduced directly from the hypothesis; second, that not just the spirited, but many other aspects are considered in between (μεταξύ, 443d7); and, last but not least, the introduction of three kinds of pleasures, appetites and rules corresponding to each part of the soul (580d). This model is not sufficient, for example, in order to explain the unjust kinds of soul, particularly the democratic soul, conceived as all-various (παντοδαπόν), full of the greatest number of dispositions (πλείστων ἡθῶν μεστόν) and many-coloured (ποικίλον) (561e2–3). In order to do this, other intermediate instantiations will be required, which allow us to think of the soul as both one and an indefinite plurality.²⁴ In any case, the image of the soul as a threefold creature — a human being, a lion and a many-headed beast, with the outward appearance of a human being (588b10–e2) — seems to me to conciliate both perspectives.

3. Two possible objections and two ontological levels

In any case, as long as Socrates thinks that the possible objections to the principle of non-contradiction will not consternate or persuade us (436e7–8), the two cases which he mentions shall be taken much more as an illustration of the validity of this principle and, accordingly, of the value of that dianoetic wisdom not just at the level of διάνοια, but also of πίστις. For against the fictional objector it should be made clear that the man standing still while moving his hands and head, represents no real counterexample to that principle, for actually it is just a part of him that stays still, while another part moves (τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ ἔστηκε, τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, 436d1). We are clearly speaking of a visible entity, like the city, with physical independent parts. We are still at the level of πίστις. In the second case, the “subtle” one, we have a spinning top, which according to the fictional objector, stands still as a whole and moves at the same time — a point of view which Socrates clearly rejects (οὐκ ἂν ἀποδεχόμεθα, 436d8), since he thinks that the top moves

²⁴ See Gutiérrez 2015b.

and stands still but not in the same respect: it stands still with respect to the axis (κατὰ τὸ εὐθύ) and it moves with respect to the circumference (κατὰ τὸ περιφερέες). Thus far we are dealing mathematically with a physical object in a way which clearly shows not just the difference, but also the connection between two ontological levels. For, first of all, the axis and the circumference are not physical parts, but mathematical entities which, nonetheless, act upon the spinning top — like the different aspects of the soul on the body. Secondly, just as the perfect circular movement of the circumference is not possible without the top staying still with respect to the axis, the harmony of the just soul is not possible without the dianoetical wisdom grounded in the principle of non-contradiction. This is a good image of the just soul in so far as everything in it follows the λογιστικόν, like the movement of the heavens which is maintained by the spindle of Necessity (616c).²⁵ But significantly Socrates introduces a second version of the spinning top, quite at variance with the first one. Then, leaving aside the mathematical view of it, he says that if the top wobbles to the right or the left, forward or backward, the whole spinning top also moves (τότε οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν ἑστάναι, 436e) as if every part of it pulls it to its direction, very much like the confused and wandering parts of the unjust soul (444ab). Consequently, as long as the first top moves around its fixed axis and the second one moves as a whole in every possible direction, we have an extraordinary image of one of the central ideas of the *Republic*: there is one form of excellence and unlimited forms of evil (ἐν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἄπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας, 445c5–6; cf. *Lg.* 898a–c).

4. *Consequences for the nature of mathematical entities and the parts of the soul*

Having shown that the principle of non-contradiction functions as a hypothesis in the same sense as the mathematical entities which Socrates mentions in the line as examples of the objects of dianoetical thinking, it follows that, first, there is no reason to limit these to

²⁵ About the relation of the spinning top with the astronomy and cosmology of Plato's time see Repellini 1998.

mathematical entities, and, second and most importantly, there is no reason to consider these entities as Forms. Then, as we have already mentioned, the principle of non-contradiction must be of the same nature as thought, that is, it is of a purely conceptual nature. The same must be valid of the mathematical entities as stable, objective and universal concepts. As such, they also emerge in the soul by and during its own reflexive movement.²⁶ Against this, it has been objected that when Socrates explains that mathematicians make use of visible forms in order to think not about them, but about the things they are images of, he mentions the square itself and the diagonal itself (510d), supposedly as Forms. Many interpreters have already noticed that that kind of expression is used somewhere else by Plato nearly *ad nauseam*, but not to refer to Forms.²⁷ I would just like to emphasize that this passage appears in this dianoetical context where he contrasts two different ontological levels: first, certain phenomena considered in themselves and, then, these same phenomena under certain circumstances, very much as in the case of the mathematical studies in *Republic* VII. And again, I sustain that this is well represented by the middle sections of the line. Thus, thirst as such (καθ' ὅσον δίψα) or thirst in itself (αὐτὸ τὸ δίψα) is referred to drink itself (αὐτοῦ πόματος), and thirst under certain circumstances is thirst of a certain drink; if warmth is added, it would be of a cold drink, if cold is added, of a warm drink, and so on. And again, every desire in itself (αὐτῇ ἢ ἐπιθυμία) is a desire only of its natural object, and a qualified desire of a qualified thing. It is always something additional (τὰ προσγιγνόμενα) that makes it a desire for this or that particular kind of object. In general,

of all things which are such as to be related to something else (τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι του)... those that are of a certain kind are related to a thing of a certain kind (τὰ μὲν ποιά ἅττα ποιοῦ τινός), whereas those that are in themselves are related only to an object which is just itself (τὰ δ' αὐτὰ τὰ δ' ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου μόνον). (438a7–b2)

²⁶ See Gaiser 1963: 97: “das Mathematische entsteht an oder in der Seele durch eine Art Reflexion der Seele auf ihre eigene Struktur”.

²⁷ *Pro multis*, see Burnyeat 2000.

Socrates distinguishes between things that by nature have an object to which they are exclusively related as their proper object, and things considered together with an additional qualitative, quantitative or temporal element related to a correspondingly qualified object. He distinguishes in this way merely conceptual, unqualified instances from sensible, qualified instances of the same phenomena. Both kinds of instances reflect, I suggest, the difference between the parts of the soul considered as separate in themselves, and as being involved in action. Those of the first kind allow us to distinguish their respective natural functions and objects, and make possible the analysis of virtues. The second suggest how they act under certain circumstances. Then, for example, every time we want to drink something, we want a certain drink, we always make certain, even if minimal, rational considerations depending on the weather, the amount of thirst we have, and so on. This explains that these desires are more complex than we thought and are necessarily self-reflexive.²⁸

Going back to the line and the cave, the square itself and the diagonal itself must not refer to Forms, but to those merely conceptual “things themselves (ἐκείνα αὐτά) which can be seen only through *dianoia* (ἃ οὐκ ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ)” (511a1–2). In so far as both passages are concerned, the one on the structure of the soul and the other on the line, they illuminate each other. I believe we should understand this sentence as an example of those phenomena considered in themselves as related exclusively to their proper objects. In this very sense, I believe, we should also understand the passage where Socrates says about arithmetic that it is studied for the sake of knowledge (τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἕνεκα), not trade: “it strongly leads the soul upwards and

²⁸ About this self-reflexive aspect of the desiring part of the soul, see 437c3–4: “as far as the soul wills that something be supplied to it, it nods assent to itself as though someone had posed a question and reached out toward the fulfillment of what it wills” (437c3–4). In contrast to the appetitive which knows only itself and its particular objects, as far as it knows the nature and functions of every part of the soul, the rational knows itself and the whole soul (441e). Cf. 442c: “it, in its turn, possesses within it the knowledge of that which is beneficial for each part and the whole composed of the community of these three parts.”

compels it to discourse about the numbers themselves (περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθαι)” (525d6). These numbers, “which can only be thought (περὶ τούτων ὧν διανοηθῆναι μόνον), and which you cannot handle in any other way,” are contrasted with visible or tangible bodies having numbers (ὁρατὰ ἢ ἀπτά σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμούς) (525d-526a).²⁹ In this way he also establishes this contrast in all the other mathematical disciplines.³⁰ Once again, we can understand this relation in terms of the dialectics of original and image well represented by the equality and inequality of the middle sections of the line.

5. Cooperation of the parts of the soul

Glaucon confesses to not understand the difference between qualified and unqualified relatives (438b3). If we apply to the soul the more general statement about the one-directional relatives used by Socrates up to now, he hasn’t understood that, by itself, every “part” of the soul has by nature a specific function, but, as suggested by the examples mentioned, when each part acts it does so jointly with the others. This will be considered again by a new series of examples. As with the spinning top, Socrates appeals to mathematical relations, but not, as in the case of the appetites, to one-directional relatives, but to two-directional or correlative relatives:³¹

— Don’t you understand that the greater is such as to be greater than something? — Certainly. — Than the less? — Yes. — And the much-greater than the much-less, isn’t that so? — Yes. — And, then, also the once-greater than the once-less, and the going-to-be-greater than the going-to-be-less? — Of course, he said. — And, further, the more in relation to the fewer, and everything of the sort; and, again, heavier to lighter, faster to slower; and further, the hot to the cold, and everything like them — doesn’t the same thing hold? (438b4–c5)

²⁹ Socrates also refers to the mathematical unity as “the one itself” (αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν, 525d9).

³⁰ Cf. explicitly about geometrical entities: ὡς τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦ ποτὲ τι γιγνομένου καὶ ἀπολλομένου... τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνώσις ἐστίν, 527b4–7. About astronomy see 529b4–530c2. About harmony, 531a1–c4.

³¹ See Santa Cruz 2013.

All these relations show clearly that in every case, in each and every point of the relation, both opposites are simultaneously present but, in every case, in different degrees. The same applies also to the two opposite movements of the soul, those of acceptance and refusal, of longing to take something and rejecting it; and lastly, to the appetitive and the rational soul. Actually, from the start in *Republic* I Socrates has insisted on the need of cooperation by members of any group or individuals in order to accomplish anything (351a–352b). The city itself is born out of this need (369b). And an extraordinary illustration of this cooperation appears in a passage which is essential for the project of the *Republic*. Speaking of the intellect and the λογιστικόν — “this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument with which each learns (τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος)” —, Socrates says that it must be turned around with the whole soul (σύν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ) from the world of becoming to that of being (518c5–8). Precisely this exhortation to the reorientation of the soul, insofar as it presupposes its double movement as a whole in opposite directions, downwards or upwards, as well as the formerly mentioned intermediate instantiations of the soul and the different kinds of pleasures, appetites and rules, should discourage us from taking the tripartition model too strictly, even in view of its acknowledged usefulness. It should remind us of the comparison of the soul with a flux or stream (ῥεῦμα), which goes wherever its desires go (485e).³² Actually, this conception is already present in *Republic* I, personified by Cephalus.³³ This means, I believe, that the conception of the soul as self-moving (τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν, *Phdr.* 245c7; cf. τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ

³² R. 485d6–8: Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτω γε εἰς ἓν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, ἴσμεν ποθ' ὅτι εἰς τὰλλα τοῦτω ἀσθενέστεραι, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκείσε ἀπωχέτεθμένον. Cf. 544e1–2: ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τὰλλα ἐφελκύσεται; 550e6–8: ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν, ὥσπερ ἐν πλαστιγῇ ζυγοῦ κειμένου εκατέρου, αἰεὶ τοῦναντίον ῥέποντε;

³³ R. 328d3–5: “I want you to know that as the other pleasures, those connected with the body, wither away in me, the desires and pleasures that have to do with speeches grow the more.” Compare with 485d: “So, when in someone they have flowed towards learning and all that's like it, I suppose they would be concerned with the pleasure of the soul itself and would forsake those pleasures that come through the body — if he isn't a counterfeit but a true philosopher.”

[ἐαυτὸ] κινούν, 245d7, 245e7–246a1; τὸ ὑφ' ἐαυτοῦ κινούμενον, 245e3; ἡ δυναμένη αὐτὴ αὐτὴ κινεῖν κίνησις, Lg. 896a1–2) is not alien to the *Republic*. Consequently, we should not think of the parts of the soul as psychological subjects or as *homunculi*,³⁴ but rather as principles of movement that, as the soul itself, move themselves and therefore are identical with their operations, and at the same time move the whole soul in one or another direction. That is also why they are conceived as self-reflexive.

6. Conclusion

Looking backwards to the ἀνάβασις τοῦ λόγου followed up to here, we have to say that even though the polis-psyche analogy together with the analysis of political justice serves as an orientation, and thus the structure of the soul and of personal justice has been studied in view of the image of political justice, it has actually been deduced from the principle of non-contradiction. Since the beginning of the enquiry into personal justice, Socrates says that the “just man will not be any different from the just city with respect to the form itself of justice (κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς διακιοσύνης εἶδος), but will be like it” (435a6–b2). Although here for the first time appears an expression which from the point of view of the philosopher refers undoubtedly to the Form of justice, its paradigmatic function will not be introduced until *Republic* V, 472c4 (παραδείγματος ἄρα ἔνεκα ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτὸ τε δικαιοσύνης οἶόν ἐστι), where the just man will be considered as the closest (ἐγγύτατα) to justice itself and as the one who participates in it more than the others (πλεῖστα τῶν ἄλλων ἐκείνης μετέχῃ), but who is in no way identical with it (472c).³⁵ This clearly implies that personal justice is an image of the Form of justice or of “doing one’s own” at the level of Forms. This is undoubtedly implied by the idea that the philosopher must imitate and assimilate himself as much as possible to that order whose elements,

³⁴ See Bobonich 2002; Lorenz 2006. Symptomatically, none of them even mention the image of πρῶμα. Against their interpretations see Price 2009.

³⁵ To understand *Republic* V–VII as a further step in the ἀνάβασις τοῦ λόγου, see Gutiérrez 2009.

the Forms, neither do injustice to one another nor suffer it from each other (οὐτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὐτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, 500c4–5). Thus we have to take into account these three ontological levels in order to establish the one to which the objects of διάνοια belong.

In *Republic* IV, the Forms have not yet been introduced. And the similitude between the just city and the just man is considered in so far as they share up to a certain point the same structure and the same affections. But having in mind the conception of the soul as ῥεῦμα, we can say that they relate to each other as a discrete magnitude to a continuous one. Therefore, when we consider justice as each class of the city or each aspect of the soul “doing each one’s own” (τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν), even if in both cases they build a unity, this unity is correspondingly of a different kind in every case. Given that personal justice is understood not just as a complete unity of many (παντάπασιν ἓνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, 443d8–9), but is also compared with musical harmony (443d5–7),³⁶ we can conceive the just soul not only as number (τὸ ἐκ μοναδῶν συγκείμενον πλῆθος τὸ ἐκ μοναδῶν³⁷), but also, as in later Platonism, as a number moving itself (ἀριθμὸς ἑαυτὸν κινῶν).³⁸ This movement is, on the one side, self-reflexive or turned inwards (περὶ τὴν ἐντός, ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, 443d1); on the other side, it is merely intentional or turned outwards (περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ, 443c10, e2–6) — but both sides interact very much like the mathematical axis and the circumference of the spinning top. As we have seen up to this point, this condition and these actions are grounded in the knowledge of the principle of non-contradiction. Precisely in order to avoid being confused and dominated by contradictory appearances, and therefore having in mind this principle, Socrates appeals to measuring, to counting and to weighing as helpers, which are functions of the λογιστικόν (602a–603a). This can clearly be understood in terms of

³⁶ Of course, σωφροσύνη is also compared to harmony, but in this case Socrates is clearly speaking of different classes and members of the city, see 432a.

³⁷ Euclides VII, Def. 2.

³⁸ Cf. Arist. *De an.* 1.2, 404b27–8; 1.4, 408b32–33; Macr. *Somn.* 1.14.19–20 (fg. 60 Heinze = fg. 176 Isnardi Parente). Aristotle thinks this opinion is the most absurd. See Dillon 2003: 121.

the relation between the inner and outer praxis of the just soul. If what I have been saying is right, the measures according to which the λογιστικόν proceeds are in the soul. Like the so-called parts of the soul, they emerge when the soul reflects on its own structure and on its own flux — as one and an indefinite plurality —, as distinguished and separated fixed moments which constitute “the lowest-level articulation of the world as it is objectively speaking.”³⁹

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³⁹ Burnyeat 2000: 22, 45.

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